Rachel Maddow is off on Afghanistan

An Open Letter Rachel Maddow about Afghanistan

By Paul Fitzgerald and Elizabeth Gould

It was when Dan Rather told Rachel Maddow on her January 27th show, “We are not seeking to colonize Afghanistan. The Soviets made no bones about it. They were coming in to take over the country. They wanted to run the country. They wanted to be there 100 or 1,000 years from now. That is not the case with what we‘re trying to do,..” we held our breath. There has been a controversy over the authenticity of Rather’s coverage of Afghanistan going back to 1980. Now in 2009 Rather was building on the his own Cold War disinformation campaign from the 1980’s and taking it to an absurd new level. We had hoped that Maddow was up to the challenge. Unfortunately, she allowed Rather’s disinformation to go unchallenged. We assumed that Maddow must not have known that Rather’s views of Soviet motives in Afghanistan and the American role were propaganda from another era. We assumed that Maddow, along with most Americans, must not have known that Rather’s reports on Afghanistan were tainted and have been challenged by many journalists.

So in response we sent a letter to Rachel Maddow regarding her January 27th interview with Dan Rather on Afghanistan summarized here.

t r u t h o u t Book Review in Tikkun

     

“Invisible History”  shows us that we now have an opportunity to transform ourselves through an honest confrontation with our past: a confrontation that would lead us to reorient our national policies around the tabernacle of our professed moral values. If we choose to ignore this opportunity, and once again turn a blind eye to history and its lessons, then we may find ourselves in grave danger, not just from the threat of terrorist attacks, but from falling victim to the same folly that has toppled empires throughout history. 

Afghanistan’s Untold Story

Sunday 31 May 2009
by Ryan Croken, t r u t h o u t  Book Review

Book Review from Newshoggers

Originally from BeltwayBlips.  The Web’s most popular political news, videos, and blogs.   

NEWSHOGGERS Politics, Foreign Affairs, Opinion and the News Less Travelled Served up Daily 

May 30, 2009
Weekend Book Review – Invisible History: Afghanistan’s Untold Story

By Ron Beasley

  “I repeat,  Invisible History: Afghanistan’s Untold Story is a must read for anyone trying to understand AF/PAK policy.  I have not even scratched the surface of what you will find in this book.”

 

Asia Times BOOK REVIEW

Behind the Afghan propaganda page  page 1 of 2 pages
Invisible History: Afghanistan’s Untold Story by Paul Fitzgerald and Elizabeth Gould

Reviewed by Anthony Fenton

Nearly 30 years after their first foray into the land-locked buffer state, married couple and journalist-historians Paul Fitzgerald and Elizabeth Gould could not have chosen a more appropriate time to publish their comprehensive Invisible History: Afghanistan’s Untold Story.

Having taken a back seat to Iraq since the drumbeat for war began in the autumn of 2002, the ongoing escalation of the United States-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) counter-insurgency war and occupation have made “AfPak” the center of  sustained US media attention for the first time since “shock and awe” temporarily drove the Taliban underground in October 2001.

A chronically disinformed US public should leap at the chance to familiarize themselves with an honest overview of their country’s historically scandalous involvement in the region. 

Despite Afghanistan’s recent return to the spotlight, few among the public realize the full extent of the US’s historical meddling in Afghanistan. Sadly, many Americans will believe the version of events that were popularized by George Crile’s book-turned-Hollywood film, Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story of how the Wildest man in Congress and a Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History of Our Times (New York: Grove Press, 2003).

Crile’s account presents an ahistorical blend of fact and fantasy as it romanticizes the largest covert operation in US history during the US-Pakistan-Saudi Arabian-financed and armed proxy war against the Soviet Union from 1979-1989. It is this collective propaganda-imbued blindspot that Fitzgerald and Gould attempt to reveal and counter. As Gould stated in an interview with Asia Times Online, Charlie Wilson’s War “is a complete flip flop of the reality”.

As such, one of the concerns that Gould and Fitzgerald are seeking to address is the problem that “there are still people in administration positions, in journalistic positions, in academic positions who still believe the fundamentals of Charlie Wilson’s War”. As Fitzgerald added, “every line cook and bottle washer in and around Washington is now an expert on Afghanistan”, reflecting a popular discourse that is “far detached from reality”.

A Solution to Washington Gridlock

Thinking Like an Afghan

By PAUL FITZGERALD and ELIZABETH GOULD

For years now, Washington’s political class has been locked in a hand-wringing debate over what to do about Afghanistan. Should the U.S. continue to plan for an extended military engagement? Can “moderate” Taliban somehow be peeled away from fanatical Taliban? Should the U.S. give up on democracy and focus on killing Al Qaeda terrorists with Predator drone assassination attacks, regardless of civilian casualties, public outrage or their legal ambiguity?
 
Although packed with foreign policy experts, the current debate remains largely grounded on what policy best serves Washington’s needs, but in terms of what’s best for Afghans, the answer to all of the above questions is no.
 
For most of the last 70 years nobody in Washington cared much about Afghanistan.  Generations of Washington diplomats found no resources to value or strategy to gain by befriending it. Kabul’s early requests for military assistance in controlling its wild eastern frontier with Pakistan were first ignored and then outright rejected, leaving Afghanistan to seek aid  from the Soviet Union. Conservative 1980’s Washington found the country endlessly useful as a cold war platform for declarations on freedom and self-determination, but then turned it over to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to determine its fate once the Red Army had left.
 
Today, every beltway pundit and media talking-head wants to help president Bema finally get Afghanistan right. But if getting Afghanistan right in 2009 boils down to abandoning everything that the U.S. and the west have invested over the last 7 years, then what do they have to lose by abandoning their old misperceptions?
 
Understanding how to forge a workable strategy  for Afghanistan may be far simpler than anyone to date has considered, if only those with the power to do so in Washington can finally shed their obsolete cold war thinking and start thinking like the Afghans who fought to establish and maintain an independent Afghan nation.
 
Thinking like an Afghan
 
From antiquity, Afghan identity has been rooted in the lands surrounding the Hindu Kush bordering the Indus river. Afghan independence began as an uprising led by a mystical Sufi philosopher Bayezid Ansari against Mughal rule in the 16th century.  Beginning  in 1747, an Afghan dynasty ruled from Kashmir to the Arabian Sea and from Central Asia to Delhi and continued to rule Afghanistan until 1978.
 
Afghan rulers defeated British armies on three separate occasions while masterfully playing Britain’s interests off against imperial Russia’s southward march.  Afghanistan’s late 19th century nation builder, Amir Abdur Rahman Khan faced impossible odds at  keeping Afghanistan independent. Yet, he fought his severest battles against his own relations, his own subjects and his own Pashtun people and he succeeded.
 
For the decade of the 1920’s, despite severe opposition from rural landowners and powerful Mullahs and destabilization from British India, Amir Amanullah Khan moved the country forward through progressive rule while bringing an unprecedented level of rights to women. And while Iran and India were occupied by allied forces during World War II, Afghanistan’s Royal Prime Minister, Hashim Khan maintained Afghanistan’s independence by staying out of the war and adhering to a strict neutrality.
 
Following the creation of  the state of Pakistan, Washington’s cold war objectives and Pakistan’s ambitions formed a single mindset. But that mindset now works against both the United States and Afghanistan as Pakistan’s military intelligence works unceasingly to undermine the efforts of Afghan moderates to establish a viable democratic state.
 
According to a recent Asia Foundation poll, 78 percent of Afghans continue to prefer democracy over any other form of government and despite its shortcomings, 68 percent said they were satisfied with the way democracy was working. An ABC/BBC/ARD National survey of Afghanistan in February found that  58 percent of the population saw the Taliban as the biggest danger while only 4 percent of Afghans support a Taliban government. Yet Washington appears immune from this reality.
 
If President Obama wishes to bring stability to Afghanistan and the region he must learn to see Afghanistan through Afghan eyes, help the Afghans defend their communities from Taliban terror, and give them the help they need to reestablish a genuine civil society.
 
In doing so, he may not only solve Afghanistan’s problems, but begin the renewal of Washington as well.
 

Cambridge Forum February 4, 2009

This statement was made by Charles Cogan, chief of the Near East-South Asia Division in the Operations Directorate of the CIA from 1979 to 1984 following our presentation of the facts we had presented regarding the true reasons for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan December 27, 1979. 

“I think your account of the Russian motivation at the time of the invasion and afterwards strikes me as being quite authentic. Prime minister Kosygin didn’t vote for the intervention. He had his doubts and he was absent from the meeting.” — Charles Cogan at the Cambridge Forum, February 4, 2009. Cogan was Chief of the Near East-South Asia Division in the Operations Directorate of the CIA from 1979 to 1984. He is now at the Kennedy School.
 

 

The New American Cold War

By Stephen F. Cohen  The Nation    June 21, 2006

US policy has fostered the belief that the American cold war was never really aimed at Soviet Communism but always at Russia, a suspicion given credence by Post and Times columnists who characterize Russia even after Communism as an inherently “autocratic state” with “brutish instincts.”

Read the full article

Posts navigation

1 2 3 25 26 27 28 29 30
Scroll to top